Lawyers, Guns, and Money: What Price Justice by Terry, Timothy R.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 88
Issue 3 Spring Article 11
Spring 1998
Lawyers, Guns, and Money: What Price Justice
Timothy R. Terry
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Supreme Court Review is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Timothy R. Terry, Lawyers, Guns, and Money: What Price Justice, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1087 (Spring 1998)
0091-4169/98/8803-1087
THE JOURNAL oF CRIM AL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 88, No. 3
Copyright 0 1998 by Northwestern Unimrsity, School of Law Prhtd in USA.
LAWYERS, GUNS, AND MONEY:
WHAT PRICE JUSTICE?
Bracyv. Gramley, 117 S. Ct. 1793 (1997)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Bracy v. Gramley,' the United States Supreme Court held
that a triple-murder defendant, William Bracy, who was con-
victed by a judge who was subsequently convicted of bribery,
showed "good cause" for discovery on his due process claim of
judicial bias.2 The Court stated that the Due Process Clause3
guarantees a fair trial before a disinterested judge.4 Here, the
presumption in favor of a public official's probity was rebutted
by Judge Thomas J. Maloney's criminal convictions Therefore,
the defendant, who made specific allegations that his trial judge
was biased against him and that his attorney was complicit in the
corruption, deserved an opportunity to show that he was enti-
tled to relief.
6
This Note argues that the very fact that Judge Maloney pre-
sided over the Bracy trial was a due process violation in and of
itself because it denied the accused his right to a fair and impar-
tial judge.7 This Note also contends that the Court's well estab-
lished position on judicial bias claims demanded something
more than the diffidence shown here; Bracy's conviction should
have been reversed outright with orders for a new trial.8 This
Note explores and discounts the possible reasons for the Court's
reluctance to act boldly in this case.9 Finally, this Note con-
cludes that little will change as a result of the Bracy decision un-
'117 S. Ct. 1793 (1997).
2 Id. at 1795.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See infra note 29 for the text of this constitutional
provision.
4 Bra.y, 117 S. Ct. at 1797.
- Id. at 1799.
6id.
7See infra Part V.A.
8 See id.
9 See infra Part V.B.
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Bracy petitioned the federal district court for habeas corpus
relief." The writ of habeas corpus 2 provides a unique and ex-
clusive federal shield for protecting individual liberty from law-
less or arbitrary state action.3 The writ provides a remedy to
state prisoners for any form of unacceptable restraint. 4 Rule 6
of the rules governing habeas corpus dictates discovery proce-
dures in habeas corpus matters. 5 Unlike the ordinary civil liti-
gant in federal court-who is automatically entitled to
discovery-the habeas petitioner's access to discovery is left to
the discretion of the court under Rule 6(a). Moreover, be-
'0 See infra Part V.C.
"Bracy v. Gramley, 868 F. Supp. 950, 950 (N.D. Il1. 1994).
12 Latin for "you have the body," the term "habeas corpus" denotes a form of col-
lateral attack designed to bring a prisoner before ajudge or tribunal. "The office of
the writ is not to determine prisoner's guilt or innocence, and [the] only issue which
it presents is whether [a] prisoner is restrained of his liberty by due process." BLACK'S
LAW DiCIONARY 709 (6th ed. 1990). The term is generally understood to refer to that
process securing release from illicit detainment, see Ex Pante Bollman, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 75, 95 (1807), also known as the writ of habeas corpus ad subjidendum. See
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474-75 n.6 (1976); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (1994).
S Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969). Sir William Blackstone called it
"the great and efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal confinement." W.
BLACESTONE, COMMENTARIES 131 (Lewis ed. 1902). Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., said
that "habeas corpus cuts through all forms and goes to the very tissue of the structure.
It comes in from the outside.., and although every form may have been preserved,
opens the inquiry whether they have been more than an empty shell." Frank v. Man-
gum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
" Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65-67 (1968); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 489-90 (1973).
" Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 6, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Rule 6 Advisory Com-
mittee Note (1994). The committee explained:
This rule contains very little specificity as to what types and methods of discovery
should be made available to the parties in a habeas proceeding, or how, once
made available, these discovery procedures should be administered. The pur-
pose of this rule is to get some experience in how discovery would work in actual
practice by letting district court judges fashion their own rules in the context of
individual cases.
Id.
I16 Bracy v. Gramley, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 1796-97 (1997); see also Rules Governing §
2254 Cases, Rule 6, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994). Rule 6(a) provides in part: "A party shall
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cause the writ does not authorize "fishing expeditions" sup-
ported by mere conclusory allegations, any petitioner request-
ing either discovery or an evidentiary hearing must make
sufficiently specific factual allegations. 7 Rule 6(a) is intended
to prevent such abuse by mandating prior court approval of all
discovery requests."8 Therefore, federal courts have the power
to entertain habeas petitions "as law and justice require" by fash-
ioning "appropriate modes of procedure."' 9
A habeas petitioner must clear a number of procedural
hurdles before she may even be heard. First, a petitioner must
be "in custody"0 in order to seek habeas relief.2' Second, prior
to seeking collateral relief in federal court, a state prisoner first
must exhaust his state court remedies.22 The exhaustion doc-
be entitled to invoke the processes of discovery available under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure if, and to the extent that, the judge in the exercise of his discretion
and for good cause shown grants leave to do so, but not otherwise." Id. Rule 6(a) is
meant to be consistent with the Court's decision in Harris v. Nelson, in which the
Court expressed "no intention to extend to habeas corpus, as a matter of right, the
broad discovery provisions... of the new [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]." Harris,
394 U.S. at 295. However, noting the dearth of ways for a habeas petitioner to gather
information, the Court offered an alternative method for securing information in ha-
beas proceedings. Id. at 298. The Court in Harris indicated that "courts may fashion
appropriate modes of procedure, by analogy to existing rules or otherwise in confor-
mity with judicial usage." Id. at 299.
n Harris v.Johnson, 81 F.3d 535, 540 (5th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 1863
(1996).
'a Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 6, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994). The Advisory
Committee Notes state in part
We are aware that confinement sometimes induces fantasy which has its basis
in the paranoia of prison rather than in fact. But where specific allegations be-
fore the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully
developed, be able to demonstrate that he is confined illegally and is therefore
entitled to relief, it is the duty of the court to provide the necessary facilities and
procedures for an adequate inquiry. Obviously, in exercising this power, the
court may utilize familiar procedures, as appropriate, whether these are found in
the civil or criminal rules or elsewhere in the "usage and principles."
Id.
19 Bracy, 117 S. Ct. at 1797. Federal courts may entertain a state prisoner's habeas
corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994).
"Commentators have written that "[t]he courts have construed 'custody' liberally
to include not only actual physical custody, but significant restraints on personal lib-
erty as well." Amos E. Hartson &Jay Gonzalez, Habeas Relieffor State Prisoners, 83 GEO.
LJ. 1392, 1394 (1995).
" 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994).
228 U.S.C. § 2254 (b) (1997) states in part: "An application for the writ of habeas
corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies
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trine grants state courts an opportunity to hear a claim and con-
sider allegations of legal error free of federal interference.
While presenting a claim to the highest state court meets the
exhaustion mandate,24 federal courts will consider only those
claims of petitioners meeting certain requirements;2 "5 a claim
must present a cognizable issue for review26 and must clear cer-
tain other procedural hurdles27 for federal jurisdiction to ap-
ply.28  Only those violations of state or federal law rising to a
constitutional level, resulting in fundamental unfairness in vio-
lation of the Due Process Clause,2 are cognizable in habeas pro-
ceedings.0
Once the procedural hurdles have been cleared, the court
will evaluate the alleged error. In Brecht v. Abrahamson,31 the Su-
preme Court held that when the error complained of is a consti-
available in the courts of the State." See also Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 257
(1986).
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982).
2' Picardv. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971).
2 Hartson & Gonzalez, supra note 20, at 1404.
26 Congress amended the habeas corpus statutes in 1996, decreeing that applica-
tions for such relief be denied unless the state court's resolution of the claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable ap-
plication of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreason-
able determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) (Supp. 1997).
27 Aside from the exhaustion doctrine, there are several procedural requirements
for habeas review. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) precludes review of "successive"
petitions raised on identical, previously ruled upon grounds. However, it should be
noted that a petition may not be procedurally prohibited if a petitioner can show
"cause" for his default. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). As the Court
in Murray explained, the "existence of cause for some procedural default must ordi-
narily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to
the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule...
[such as, for example, by showing that the] factual or legal basis for a claim was not
reasonably available to counsel." Id
28 Hartson & Gonzalez, supra note 20, at 1404.
2 The Fourteenth Amendment states in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
3 Hartson & Gonzalez, supra note 20, at 1401-02; see also Pulley v. Harris, 465
U.S. 37, 41-42 (1984).
3' 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
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tutional trial error, the remedy of habeas corpus is appropriate
only if the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influ-
ence in determining the jury's verdict."32 However, the Court
distinguished constitutional trial errors from constitutional struc-
tural errors, noting that the latter variety, because of their very
insidiousness, require automatic reversal.3 The Court reasoned
that "[t]rial error... is amenable to harmless-error analysis be-
cause it 'may . ..be quantitatively assessed in the context of
other evidence presented in order to determine [the effect it
had on trial] .,,, Judicial bias, however, is a structural defect not
amenable to harmless-error analysis.35 That is, the Due Process
Clause requires that a defendant receive a fair trial before a disin-
terested judge.6
B. JUDICIAL BIAS
The test used to evaluate judicial bias claims was established
in Tumey v. Ohio.37 Ed Tumey was arrested, charged with unlaw-
ful possession of an intoxicating liquor, and brought before the
32 Id at 623 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
"Id. at 629-30.
3' Id. (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 449 U.S. 279; 307 (1991)). Continuing, the
Court said that "[a] t the other end of the spectrum of constitutional errors lie struc-
tural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by harm-
less-error standards... [tihe existence of such defects... requires automatic reversal
of the conviction because they infect the entire trial process." Id.
sSullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 283 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see
also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 290 (1991) (listingjudicial bias as one of the
"three constitutional errors that could not be categorized as harmless error"); Bracy v.
Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 1996) (commenting that "judicial bias is one of
those structural defects.., that automatically entitle a petitioner for habeas corpus to
a new trial").
Bracy, 117 S. Ct. at 1799. In Marshall v.Jerrico, Inc., the Supreme Court said:
The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribu-
nal in both civil and criminal cases.... The neutrality requirement helps to
guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of an erro-
neous or distorted conception of the facts or the law. At the same time, it pre-
serves both the appearance and reality of fairness, "generating the feeling, so
important to a popular government, that justice has been done," by ensuring
that no person will be deprived of his interests in the absence of a proceeding in
which he may present his case with assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed
to find against him.
446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 172 (1951) (FrankfurterJ., concurring)).
37 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
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mayore of North College Hill, Ohio. 9 Tumey moved for dis-
missal arguing that, because the mayor and his village received a
portion of any fines collected,0 the mayor was biased against
him and therefore barred from trying him under the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.4 1 The mayor denied
the motion, convicted Mr. Tumey, and imprisoned him pending
payment of a fine. 2 The Ohio Court of Common Pleas re-
versed, holding that the mayor should have disqualified himself
because of his interest in the trial's result.3 That decision in
turn was struck down by the Ohio Court of Appeals. 4 The Ohio
Supreme Court dismissed the petition in error 5 for lack of a
debatable constitutional question, and the United States Su-
preme Court granted review.
6
The Court cited a series of lower court decisions for the
proposition that disqualification is required when those acting
in a judicial or quasi-judicial role have an interest in the contro-
versy to be decided. 7 The real question, the Court continued, is
"to what degree or nature" the interest must be."8 The Court
noted that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee
clearly is violated if the judge has "a direct, personal, substantial
pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against [a defen-
dant] in his case. 9 It is "certainly not fair ... [for a defendant
to have] the prospect of [a prospective] loss by the judge] ...
Mayor Pugh was authorized by Ohio statute to sit in judgment of one accused of
violating the State's Prohibition Act. Id. at 514.
SId. at 515.
40 During the period in question (May 11 through Dec. 31, 1923), the village court
collected over $20,000 in fines for prohibition violations. The state received
$8,992.50, the village received $4,471.25, and the mayor received $696.35 for his fees
and costs, in addition to his regular salary. Id. at 521-22.
Id. at 515.42 Id.
44 Id.
4' The defendant's petition in error asked that the appellate court's decision be re-
versed on constitutional grounds. Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 522.
" R at 523. However, the Court also indicated that "[a]ll questions of judicial
qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship, per-
sonal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would seem generally to be matters
merely of legislative discretion." Id.
1092 [Vol. 88
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weigh against his acquittal," because such concerns lie outside
the issue of guilt or innocence.50
The Court established a strict standard by which future tri-
bunals would evaluate judicial bias claims:
Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average
man as ajudge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the de-
fendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and
true between the state and the accused denies the latter due process of
law.
51
The Court emphasized that, even though all judges might not
be tempted by the prospect of a $12 windfall, 2 such a hair-
trigger standard was necessary. 3 The Court explained that "the
requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not
satisfied by the argument that men of the highest honor and
greatest self-sacrifice could carry it on without danger of injus-
tice."5'4 This served as the standard in the few Supreme Court
judicial bias cases that have come to bar in the seventy years
since Tumey.
55
Following the same tack as the Tumey Court, the Court in In
re Murchison concluded that a judge may not preside over a case
in which he or she has an interest.56 Ajudge with a stake in the
outcome of a trial violates the due process guarantee of a fair
trial before a fair tribunal.57 This guarantee, at the very least,
necessitates the absence of actual bias at trial. s The Court clan-
0 Id. at 532.
" Id. (emphases added). Some commentators have noted that, notwithstanding
the test's sweeping and broad language, the Tumey Court's "direct, personal, substan-
tial pecuniary interest" language has become the defacto standard for adjudicatingju-
dicial bias cases. See, ag., Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory
Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE LJ. 455, 500 (1986)
(commenting that the Court unjustifiably has been "extremely reluctant to disqualify
ajudge when no direct financial interest is involved").
52 The mayor received $12.00 for his fees and costs as a result of Tumey's convic-
tion. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 531.
"Id. at 532.
Id.
"See, e-g., Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 59-60 (1972).
"In reMurchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). The Court addressed the question of
"whether a contempt proceeding.., complies with the due process requirement of
an impartial tribunal where the same judge presiding at the contempt hearing had
also served as the 'one-man grand jury' out of which the contempt charges arose." Id.
at 134. The Court held in a 6-to-3 decision that, under these circumstances, the peti-
tioners' due process rights were violated. IR. at 139.




fled that the American judicial system requires an unusually
strict standard for the adjudication of judicial bias claims:
"[O]ur system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness." 9 Whether a claim presents such a
possibility depends upon the context and the nature of the in-
terest. ° Characterizing the Tumey standard as appropriate, the
Court voiced its intention to err on the side of caution: "Such a
stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no
actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales
of justice equally between contending parties. But to perform
its high function in the best way 'justice must satisfy the appear-
ance ofjustice.' 61
In a case remarkably similar to Tumey, the Supreme Court in
Ward again held that a defendant tried before a mayor's court
was denied the due process right to a fair trial before an impar-
tial judicial officer.62 The Court based its holding on the princi-
ples laid down in Tumey, specifically invoking the Tumey "test."
The Court further asserted that for a judge to be deemed biased
he need not share directly in the fines levied by his court.6 This
condition "did not define the limits of the principle" governing
judicial bias claims.r That principle requires nothing more
than a possible temptation that might lead a judge to be biased.6
The Court concluded that the circumstances under which the
petitioner was convicted were constitutionally infirm:
Plainly that "possible temptation" may also exist when the mayor's execu-
tive responsibilities for village finances may make him partisan to main-
tain the high level of contribution from the mayor's court. This [as in
Tumey] is a "situation in which an official perforce occupies two practi-
59 1&.
Id.
61 Id. (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
62 Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972). The defendant in Ward
was convicted in a local mayor's court of two traffic offenses. Id. at 57. After the Su-
preme Court of Ohio upheld the conviction, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed. Id. at 62. The Court reasoned that, because the mayor was responsible for
village finances-some portion of which derived from fines levied by his court-the
defendant had been denied the due process right to a trial before a disinterested ju-
dicial officer. Id. at 59-60.
'" See id. at 59.
Id. at 60.
"See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 881094
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cally and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other ju-
dicial, and necessarily involves a lack of due process of law."
67
Two 1986 cases reaffirmed the Tumey test.s The first,
Vasquez v. Hillery, involved a habeas corpus petition challenging
a murder conviction on equal protection grounds because Afri-
can-Americans were systematically excluded from the grandjury. 6 In upholding the habeas challenge, the Court said:70
When constitutional error calls into question the objectivity of those
charged with bringing a defendant to judgment, a reviewing court can
neither indulge a presumption of regularity nor evaluate the resulting
harm. Accordingly, when the trial judge is discovered to have had some
basis for rendering a biased judgment, his actual motivations are hidden
from review, and we must presume that the process was impaired.
7 1
The Court bolstered this proposition with reference to Tumey,
noting that the Tumey Court reversed the conviction despite the
lack of evidence that bias actually played a role in the decision-
making process.72 In Tumey, it was the mayor's financial interest
in the proceedings that satisfied the "possible temptation" re-
quirement.73 Similarly, the Court in Vasquez concluded that
"when a petit jury has been selected upon improper criteria...
we have required reversal because the effect of the violation
cannot be ascertained."7 4
In Aetna Life Insurance v. Lavoie, the Court held that a
judge's participation in adjudicating an insurance claim violated
the insurer's due process rights where the judge had personally
filed similar claims against other insurance companies in the
state.75 Alabama Supreme Court Justice Embry participated in a
67 Ward, 409 U.S. at 60 (emphasis added) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,
534 (1927)). Justices White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented, arguing against
striking down the Ohio system on its face and insisting that a prophylactic, per se rule
was inappropriate. Id. at 62 (White, J., dissenting). The dissenters further argued
that Tumey was not controlling in Ward because, in the latter case, the mayor lacked a
direct pecuniary interest. Id (White,J, dissenting).
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 255-56 (1986); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475
U.S. 813, 819 (1986).
"Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 255-56. African-American defendant Booker T. Hillery was
indicted for murder by one of the many all-white grand juries personally selected by
Superior CourtJudge Meredith Wingrove. Id.70 Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, White and Stevens joined.
71 Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 263.
Id (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927)).73 id.
74 
id.
Aetna Life Ins. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 819 (1986).
19981 1095
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5-to-4 decision affirming a jury verdict for the insured in a bad-
faith insurance claim.76 The court awarded the insured com-
pensatory and punitive damages." At the time of the decision,
Justice Embry himself had filed claims against two other Ala-
bama insurance companies, each alleging bad-faith failure to
pay a claim.7 Examining the factors that might have influenced
Embry's decision or given him "an interest in the outcome," the
Supreme Court held that Embry's interest was "direct, personal,
substantial, and pecuniary."79
The Court was quick to point out, however, that Embry's in-
terest surpassed the threshold necessary to constitute a due pro-
cess violation:
Justice Embry's participation in this case violated appellant's due process
rights as explicated in Tumey, Murchison, and Ward. We make clear that
we are not required to decide whether in fact Justice Embry was influ-
enced, but only whether sitting on the case .. .would offer a possible
temptation to the average judge to lead him not to hold the balance
nice, clear and true.80
The Court concluded by asserting that "the appearance of jus-
tice will best be served by vacating the decision.'
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 12, 1980, William Bracy, Roger Collins, and
Murray Hooper abducted three men12 from an apartment at
2240 South State Street in Chicago, Illinois.0 Bracy, Collins,
and Hooper bound the three men with rope, drove them to a
viaduct at Roosevelt Road and Clark Street, and shot them to
death.84 A minor participant in the crime, Morris Nellum,
pleaded guilty to three counts of concealing a homicide and
76 Id. at 816. Justice Embry cast the decisive vote in this decision. However, the
Court did not specifically make this a factor in the opinion. Instead, the majority
merely commented that, while some courts will not overturn a decision "where a dis-
qualified judge's vote is mere surplusage ... we are aware of no case... permitting a
court's decision to stand when a disqualified judge casts the deciding vote." Id. at
827-28.
7Id at 816.
78 1& at 817.
9Id at 824.
80 Id. at 825 (emphases added).
81 Id, at 828.
12 The three men were Richard Holliman, Frederick Lacey, and R.C. Pettigrew.




agreed to cooperate with the prosecution and serve as its main
witness in exchange for a state-recommended three year sen-
tence in protective custody.8
Nellum testified that on the evening of November 12, 1980,
he was with his girlfriend, Regina Parker, at her apartment at
2222 South State Street.8 He testified that Collins showed up at
approximately 9:30 p.m. and asked him to go to apartment 206
at 2240 South State Street to help him "take care of some-
thing. 87 Nellum arrived at the apartment several minutes later
and saw Collins, Bracy, and Hooper holding the three bound
victims at gun-point.8 Collins handed the keys to his Cadillac to
Nellum, asking that Nellum pick him up after he (Collins)
"drop[p~d] some people off." 9 Nellum then watched as they
placed the three victims in a red Oldsmobile.9 Collins drove
the Oldsmobile to the viaduct, with Hooper in the passenger
seat and the three victims in the rear.91 Bracy followed in his
own car.92 At Collins' request, Nellum waited several minutes af-
ter the other two vehicles left before following them to the via-
duct.93 Upon arriving at the viaduct, Nellum heard a number of
gunshots.94 He saw Bracy, carrying a sawed-off shotgun, and
Hooper emerge from the viaduct and run to Bracy's car.5
Collins got into the Cadillac with Nellum, and the two cars re-
turned to the parking lot at 2240 South State Street.6 Collins
and Nellum then drove to Lake Michigan where they disposed
of two handguns.97
In 1981, Bracy and Collins were tried jointly on charges of
armed robbery,8 aggravated kidnapping, and murder, before
Bracy v. Gramley, 868 F. Supp. 950, 959 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
People v. Collins, 478 N.E.2d 267, 272 (Ill. 1985).












Judge Thomas J. Maloney in the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois.9 The jury found Bracy guilty on all counts, and Judge
Maloney sentenced him to death.'0°
Throughout the criminal proceedings, Judge Maloney made
numerous discretionary rulings0 1 that "potentially affected the
outcome of' Bracy's case. For example, Maloney appointed
his former associate, Robert McDonald, to represent Bracy
throughout the trial and sentencing hearing.0 3 Judge Maloney
excused for cause the only African-American jury panel mem-
ber.' 4 Maloney denied co-defendant Collins' motion to sup-
press evidence and his request for a separate penalty hearing.'05
He rejected jury instructions proffered by the defense and, prior
to the penalty phase and despite McDonald's claimed lack of
preparedness, declined to grant a continuance.'0 Finally, over
defense counsel's objection, Judge Maloney admitted evidence
of an unadjudicated Arizona homicide that implicated Bracy. 07
Notwithstanding the suspect nature of these rulings, on di-
rect appeal the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed Bracy's con-
victions and two of the three sentences-reducing the
aggravated kidnapping penalty to thirty years imprisonment. 1
08
The court also affirmed the trial court's denial of a continuance
prior to the death sentencing hearing.'9 While in prison, Bracy
filed a petition for relief pursuant to the Illinois Post Conviction
Id. at 958. Murray Hooper was tried separately. People v. Collins, 478 N.E.2d
267, 272 (Ill. 1985).
100 Petitioner's Brief at 5, Bracy (No. 96-6133).
10' Black's Law Dictionary defines "discretionary acts" as:
Option open to judges and administrators to act or not as they deem proper or
necessary and such acts or refusal to act may not be overturned without a show-
ing of abuse of discretion, which means an act or failure to act that no conscien-
tious person acting reasonably could perform or refuse to perform.
BLACK's LAW DIGTIONARY, supra note 12, at 467.






... People v. Collins, 478 N.E.2d 267, 289 (Ill. 1985).
09 Id at 287.
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Hearing Act.110 The Circuit Court of Cook County denied the
petition without an evidentiary hearing."'
Meanwhile, on June 26, 1991, a federal grand jury indicted
Judge Thomas J. Maloney.112 The charges in the indictment in-
cluded bribery, racketeering, income tax evasion, extortion un-
der color of official right, and obstruction ofjustice. 5 The case
went to trial in March, 1993.14
When news of Maloney's indictment first became public in
June of 1991, Bracy immediately attempted to file an additional
claim alleging judicial misconduct.1 15 However, Bracy's case was
already in the latter stages of post-conviction proceedings."6
Consequently, the judicial corruption issue was raised for the
first time in the reply brief of the postconviction appeal.1  The
Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the circuit court's denial of
the post-conviction petition, declining to consider the new is-
118
sue.
On April 16, 1993, ajury in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois convicted Maloney on all
counts." 9 Among the counts for which he was found guilty was
accepting bribe money in exchange for acquittals in murder
cases.12 0 Maloney was sentenced to fifteen years and nine
months in a federal penitentiary.'1
2
, 0 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-1 (West 1996); see also Petitioner's Brief at 2, Bracy
(No. 96-6133).
... Collins, 478 N.E.2d at 287.
112 United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1995). Judge Maloney fell
victim to the federal investigation dubbed "Operation Greylord." Maurice Possley,
Alleged Hit Man Back In Court After His Tainted Acquittal, CI. TRM., Sept. 21, 1997, at
A7. During a 1975 organized crime probe, federal agents overheard an attorney talk-
ing about how he could fix gambling cases by bribing Cook Countyjudges. Id. When
confronted, the attorney agreed to cooperate with federal investigators in what would
become "Operation Greylord." Id. Aimed at uncovering the long-suspected corrup-
tion within the Cook County Judicial System, Greylord saw its first indictments in
1983. Id. Ultimately, Greylord helped send over 100 officials to prison, including
nearly two dozenjudges. Id.
" Maloney, 71 F.3d at 649.
"1 Id. at 652.
"s Petitioner's Brief at 6, Bracy (No. 96-6133).
,5Id.
", Bracy v. Gramley, 868 F. Supp. 950, 991 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
118 Ird
"9 Maloney, 71 F.3d at 652.
'
20 Bracy, 868 F. Supp. at 990.
121 Amicus Brief of Concerned Illinois Lawyers and Law Professors in Support of
Petitioner at 7, Bracy v. Gramley, 117 S. Ct. 1793 (1997) (No. 96-6133).
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In August, 1993, having exhausted his state remedies, Bracy
petitioned the federal district court for habeas corpus relief.'
Bracy alleged a violation of his constitutional right to due proc-
ess by reason ofjudicial corruption.12 3 He claimed that, because
of Judge Maloney's practice of taking bribes from certain de-
fendants in exchange for acquittal, the judge was actually biased
against the defense in those cases in which he was not paid off.
24
Bracy further alleged that Maloney's bias against him, intended
to camouflage his corruption and allay any suspicion of wrong-
doing, resulted in pro-prosecution rulings, particularly on dis-
cretionary matters.'5 Bracy's new attorney, handling the habeas
corpus matter, argued that many of Maloney's discretionary rul-
ings disfavored the defense; he sought additional discovery on
the issue of actual bias. 26 Newly discovered evidence indicated
thatJudge Maloney received bribes in criminal cases in the early
1980s, contemporaneous with Bracy's case. 7 In fact, the evi-
dence confirmed that Maloney fixed murder trials immediately
prior to and after Bracy's trial.
In response to this newly obtained information, Bracy made
various discovery requests.'29 First, he sought review of the
sealed transcript of Maloney's trial, as well as any information
possessed by the government lawyers who prosecuted Judge Ma-
loney.' 30 He also asked to depose the Government's witnesses,
hoping to unearth evidence about Maloney's conduct in cases
in which he received no payoffs. 3' Finally, Bracy requested to
examine Maloney's discretionary rulings for any telltale pattern
of bias.
3 2
The district court, finding sufficient cause for not raising
the judicial corruption issue in state courts,' 33 nonetheless held
that Bracy's allegations were not specific enough and lacked
'2 Bracy, 868 F. Supp. at 958; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994).
'2 Petitioner's Brief at 6, Bracy (No. 96-6133).
124 Bracy, 868 F. Supp. at 990.
125 Id.
'2 Id. at 990-91.
2 Petitioner's Brief at 7, Bracy (No. 96-6133).
128 Id.
129 Id.
0 Id. at 7-8.
13 Id. at 7.
12 Id. at 7-8.
"' See supra note 27.
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good cause to justify further discovery.TM Accordingly, the court
denied Bracy's discovery requests and dismissed his petition.135
Bracy appealed his case to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit.
1
In 1996, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court
judgment. '3 While acknowledging the possibility of underesti-
mating "the cumulative effect of [Maloney's] rulings," the court
was reluctant to speculate on the possible impact of Maloney's
corruption.13' The court deemed Bracy unable to show that Ma-
loney's favorable rulings were so few as to lead inescapably to
the inference that he was biased in favor of the prosecution!'9
Furthermore, if such a showing were even feasible, a full-blown
investigation would not help; a mere perusal of the transcript
would be sufficient.140 Noting that the Illinois Supreme Court
found no errors in the rulings, the Seventh Circuit concluded
that the likelihood was slim that any of Maloney's discretionary
's Bracy v. Gramley, 868 F. Supp. 950, 990-91 (N.D. Ill. 1994). In ruling, the dis-
trict court relied principally on the Seventh Circuit decision in Del Vecchio v. Illinois
Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (denying prisoner's
habeas petition following murder conviction and death sentence, and finding that
the convicting trial court judge was not disqualified for bias merely because he had
been involved in prosecuting the same defendant for murder 14 years earlier). The
district court noted that there was no evidence that Maloney solicited or received
bribes in Bracy's case. Bracy, 868 F. Supp. at 990. Furthermore, Bracy could not iden-
tify any unfavorable ruling that would have gone the other way had another judge
presided. Id. at 991. Even if Bracy were able to demonstrate that Maloney favored
the prosecution in non-payoff cases, the court reasoned, any analogies to Bracy's case
were mere speculation and therefore insufficient to establish a claim of actual bias.
Id.
"'Bray, 868 F. Supp. at 990-91.
Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 687 (7th Cir. 1996).
"'7 Id. at 696.
"s Id. at 690.
1"9 Id.
"40 Id. The court argued that "[s]ome of Maloney's rulings went against the defen-
dants ... but they have not shown that there were so few rulings in their favor that
the judge must have been biased in favor of the government." Id. To sentiments
such as these Judge Rovner responded in dissent:
But if petitioners can be faulted for not making the most of the available mate-
rial, we can be faulted for being naive about what the cold page of the trial rec-
ord will reveal. . . . Maloney was by no account stupid. When he sold an
acquittal, he wanted facts that he could hang his hat on ... if he wanted to culti-
vate a pro-prosecution record to protect his interests as a bribe taker, he had the
ability to do so discretely, [sic] without appearing to have abused his discretion as
a trial judge.
Id. at 698-99 (Rovner,j., dissenting).
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acts was the product of a pro-prosecution bias.' In support of
its judgment, the court announced, "[A] n appearance of im-
propriety does not constitute a denial of due process." Judge
Ilana Diamond Rovner dissented from the majority's opinion.4
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari4 4 to
determine whether, based on Bracy's showing, he was entitled
to discovery under Habeas Corpus Rule 6(a) to support his
claim ofjudicial bias. 45
IV. SUMMARY OF THE COURT'S OPINION
Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Rehnquist re-
versed the Seventh Circuit and remanded the case for further
proceedings.'46 The Court held that Bracy showed good cause
for discovery on his due process claim of judicial bias.14 7 Al-
though the broad discovery provisions promulgated by the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply in habeas corpus
proceedings,48 the United States Constitution requires "a fair
trial in a fair tribunal, before a judge with no actual bias against
the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular
' Id. at 690.
" Id. The Seventh Circuit emphasized that, because habeas corpus is such an ex-
traordinary remedy-upsetting as it does a court's final judgment-discovery must be
granted only for "good cause." Id. Bracy's discovery requests, the court found, were
either unnecessary or frivolous. Id. at 690-91. First, the request to examine Maloney's
bribery-free cases for a pro-prosecution pattern did not require formal discovery since
those cases were a matter of public record. Id. Second, the request to view Govern-
ment materials pertaining to the Maloney prosecution would be satisfied upon a read-
ing and analysis of the transcript. Id. at 691. Though admitting that the trial record
had been sealed since August of 1994, the court implied that a year and a half to
search the record should have been sufficient. Id. The court dismissed as a fishing
expedition the third discovery request to depose some of Maloney's former associates
on the subject of non-bribery cases. Id. at 690-91. Because these readily available al-
ternatives to formal discovery uncovered no evidence of bias in Bracy's trial, "the
probability is slight that a program of depositions aimed at crooks and their accom-
plices and likely to be derailed in any event by real and feigned lapses of memory will
yield such evidence." Id. at 691.
Id. at 696 (RovnerJ., dissenting).
'"Bracy v. Gramley, 117 S. Ct. 726 (1997).
5 Bracy v. Gramley, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 1795 (1997).
16 Id. at 1799-800.
147 Id. Bracy's was a habeas corpus petition. The claim was that Judge Maloney's
interest in the outcome of Bracy's case violated the fair trial guarantee of the Due
Process Clause. Id. at 1795.
' Id. at 1797.
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case.' '149 Accordingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, if Ma-
loney's bias against non-paying defendants were proved, Bracy
would have a strong case for claiming a violation of his due pro-
cess rights.
5 0
Having determined that Bracy's underlying premise ofjudi-
cial bias merited evaluation, the Court addressed whether Bracy
showed good cause for discovery to substantiate that premise.'5 '
The Court relied on three factors to conclude that good cause
was shown. 52  First, Bracy's attorney, Robert McDonald, was a
former associate of Maloney's."" McDonald was appointed by
the judge to defend Bracy in June 1981 and claimed to be ready
for trial just a few weeks later. 54 Moreover, McDonald did not
request additional time to prepare for the State's possible intro-
duction of aggravating evidence at the penalty phase, in the
event there was a penalty phase. 55 Second, at least one of Ma-
loney's former law associates, Robert McGee,56 also was involved
in Maloney's corruption, sometimes bribing the judge himself. 57
Third, Bracy's case was squeezed in between two other murder
trials in whichJudge Maloney received bribes.'
In order to establish entitlement to discovery, a party must
produce "some evidence tending to show the existence of the
,9 Id. However, as ChiefJustice Rehnquist noted, because "the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a constitutional floor, not a uniform stan-
dard," issues addressing the fitness of ajudge to hear a case rarely rise to the level of a
constitutional question. Id.
,Id. Bracy alleged that "Maloney's taking of bribes from some criminal defen-
dants not only rendered him biased against the State in those cases, but also induced a
sort of compensatory bias against defendants who did not bribe Maloney." Id. (empha-
ses in original). He also claimed that "[t]here is cause to believe that Judge Ma-
loney's discretionary rulings in this case may have been influenced by a desire on his
part to allay suspicion of his pattern of corruption and dishonesty" and to avoid the
appearance of being soft on crime. Id. at 1798.
. Id- at 1797-98. Noting only that Bracy's convictions had been upheld twice by
the Illinois Supreme Court, the Supreme Court offered no opinion on whether these
discretionary rulings were correct. Id. at 1798 n.6.
"5 Id. at 1798-99.
'13 Id. at 1798. This was relevant because other former associates of Maloney, in-
cluding attorneys, played key roles in the bribery scheme.
', Id. This presumably provided the Court with further circumstantial evidence
that Maloney intentionally appointed a confederate who would not object to the tim-
ing of the case.
... Id. at 1798-99.
"6 Mr. McGee was an attorney at Maloney's former law firm. Id. at 1798.
'-
7 Id. at 1799.
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essential elements" of a claim.5 9 The Court explained that
"where specific allegations before the court show reason to be-
lieve that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be
able to demonstrate that he is... entitled to relief, it is the duty
of the court to provide the necessary facilities and procedures
for an adequate inquiry."' 6° Bracy relied not only on Maloney's
proven history of bribe-taking, but also upon "specific allega-
tions" against his own lawyer.'6 ' Bracy alleged that Robert
McDonald was in league with Judge Maloney and privy to his
corrupt practices and therefore had agreed to take the case on a
no-hassle fast-track basis so as to camouflage the suspicious cir-
cumstances of the two contemporaneous, fixed trials 62
The Court particularly focused on Maloney's extensive cor-
ruption. 63 Relying on the United States proffer," the Court
noted that "although [it is] difficult to imagine, Thomas Ma-
loney's life of corruption was considerably more expansive than
proved at trial."' Maloney "fixed serious felony cases regularly
while a practicing criminal defense attorney" and this corrup-
tion continued into his judicial tenure.16 Through his political
and organized crime connections, Maloney maintained an on-
going relationship with corrupt judges, deputy sheriffs, bailiffs,
several lawyers, and scores of underworld figures.6 7 The Court
"' United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1488 (1996). The Court in Arm-
strong, after offering a variety of alternative labels for the showing such as "colorable
basis, substantial threshold showing, substantial and concrete basis, or reasonable
likelihood," appeared to settle on "some evidence tending to show the existence of
the essential elements." Id.
0 Bracy, 117 S. Ct. at 1799 (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299 (1969)).
Recall that this proposition is meant to be consistent with Habeas Corpus Rule 6. Id.
See supra note 16; see also Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 6, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Ad-
visory Committee Notes (1994).
161 Bracy, 117 S. Ct. at 1799.
162 Id.
6' Id. at 1798. For this information the Court relied primarily on the petitioner's
brief, his submission of a newspaper article reporting testimony from Maloney's trial,
a copy of the Maloney indictment, a supplemental motion for discovery, and the
United States Proffer of Evidence in Aggravation in Maloney's case. Id.
161 Prior to Maloney's sentencing, the United States Attorney for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois presented to Judge Leinenweber evidence in aggravation and the Gov-
ernment's memorandum supporting consideration of that evidence.
1 Bracy, 117 S. Ct. at 1798.
16 Id.
167 Id. at 1798-99. The Court, particularly persuaded by the testimony of William
Swano (a corrupt attorney and former Maloney "customer"), remarked: "According
to Swano, Maloney retaliated against one of Swano's clients in one of the rare cases
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concluded that the evidence, coupled with Maloney's conviction
for bribe-taking, made sufficiently plausible Bracy's claim that
Maloney was actually biased against Bracy in his own case.18
The Court acknowledged that public officials are presumed
to have carried out their responsibilities properly, and that,
were this presumption not "soundly rebutted," it might have
concurred with the Seventh Circuit decision that Bracy's theo-
ries were too speculative to warrant discovery.16 However, based
on Bracy's showing, the Court held that he should have been
granted discovery pursuant to Habeas Corpus Rule 6(a) to fur-
ther develop his plausible claims of judicial bias.170 The Court
reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded
the case for further proceedings.
V. ANALYSIS
Although the Supreme Court in Bracy v. Gramley correctly
ruled that Bracy had shown "good cause" for discovery on his
judicial bias claim, it should have gone further. The Bracy Court
confined its review to the narrow habeas question, refusing to
acknowledge that issue's ultimate irrelevance compared to the
violation of Bracy's due process rights. Judge Maloney's pre-
siding over the Bracy trial was a due process violation in and of
itself, which deprived Bracy of his right to a fair and impartial
judge. As such, Bracy's conviction should have been reversed
outright.
Judicial bias infected Bracy's trial. This is true irrespective
of whether one applies the narrow or broad Tumey standard.
when Swano failed to offer Maloney a bribe and, in bribe negotiations in a later case,
Maloney's bag man Robert McGee admitted as much." Id& at 1797 n.5. A former pub-
lic defender, Swano testified that he learned that, in order "to practice in front of
Judge Maloney... we had to pay." Id.
' ad. at 1799.
169 id
170 i.
7 Id. at 1799-800.
'7In a footnote the Court commented:
The dissenting [7th Circuit] judge insisted that petitioner had shown "good
cause" for discovery to support his judicial bias claim, and went on to state that,
in her view, petitioner was entitled to relief whether or not he could prove that
Maloney's corruption had any impact on his trial. The latter conclusion, of
course, would render irrelevant the discovery-related question presented in this
case.
Id. at 1796 n.4 (internal citations omitted).
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The broad and sweeping propositions found in post-Tumeyjudi-
cial bias cases have been circumscribed and tempered somewhat
by invocation of Tumey's "direct, personal, substantial pecuni-
ary" language. 3 Despite the Court's bold words stating that
"every procedure" offering a mere "possible temptation" to be bi-
ased violates due process, 74 the Court rarely disqualifies judges
who do not have some sort of pecuniary interest in the outcome
of a case.'75 Arguably, Tumey offers a narrower, more financially
focused standard than that found in Murchison or Ward."76 How-
ever, the Court has never stated this; it appears to view Tumey
and its progeny as one coherent monolith, the latter completely
consistent and compatible with the former.177  Additionally,
some commentators argue that there are actually two standards
for evaluating judicial bias claims-the broad standard estab-
lished by the Tumey test proscribing "every procedure which
would offer a possible temptation;" and the narrow standard,
also originating in Tumey, implying that an interest must be "di-
rect, personal ... [and] pecuniary."' 78 Even under the most re-
strictive reading of Tumey, Maloney still should be condemned
as biased because he had a "pecuniary" stake in the outcome of
Bracy's trial. Moreover, Judge Maloney's interest was sufficiently
"direct." However, this narrow reading requiring a pecuniary
interest is inappropriate; an arbitrary financial/non-financial
distinction is not strongly supported by the most prominent ju-
dicial bias decisions. In fact, the language in Tumey and its
progeny more strongly supports the broader standard'79 for
evaluating judicial bias claims. Under this broader reading,
'7 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927). See supra note 51 and accompanying
text.
... Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532 (emphasis added).
'7' Redish & Marshall, supra note 51, at 500-01.
'76 That is, although the Court in Tumey, Murchison, and Ward speaks of a "stringent
rule" broadly proscribing "evey procedure" which may lead to a "possible temptation"
to be biased, it is arguable that the Tumey Court's reference to a "direct, personal,
substantial pecuniary interest" has become the defacto standard for assessing judicial
bias claims. See Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532; In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955);
Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972). See also supra note 51.
' See, eg., Aetna, 475 U.S. at 821-22 (describing the conclusions in Tumey and In re
Murchison as "similar").
,78 Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523. See supra note 51 and accompanying text; see also Redish
& Marshall, supra note 51, at 500.




Judge Maloney is clearly disqualified in light of the extraordi-
nary extent of his corruption. Moreover, neither the evidence
offered against Bracy, nor the fact that his conviction was twice
upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court, should be relevant to
whether his conviction warrants reversal. Dread of opening the
floodgates to costly re-hearings is no excuse for judicial diffi-
dence in Bracy's case. Lastly, if Bracy is to have significant im-
pact, lower court judges will need to fashion remedies beyond
the point where the Supreme Court feared to tread.
A. BRACY'S CONVICTION CALLED FOR OUTRIGHT REVERSAL
The Bracy Court strenuously resisted admitting the irrefuta-
ble conclusion that Maloney's presiding over the Bracy trial
stripped that proceeding of any semblance of justice. Instead,
turning a blind eye to the mandate established in Tumey and its
progeny, ' ° the Court immersed itself in the procedural minutia
of the habeas question. Indeed, the Court appeared to relegate
the constitutional due process question to the status of a postu-
late of the procedural habeas corpus inquiry, all but admitting
Maloney's constitutional inadequacy in order to explain why the
petitioner was entitled to discovery to prove Maloney's constitu-
tional inadequacy.""
The Court found the presumption ,in favor of Maloney's
fairness "soundly rebutted."182 It acknowledged the possibility
that Bracy's trial attorney, privy to the corrupt scheme, may have
agreed to take the case on a no-hassle fast-track to deflect suspi-
cion from his suddenly risk-averse former associate (Maloney) .
However, the Court disingenuously discounted these probative
findings as mere "additional evidence" and "specific allegations"
necessary to support his discovery request.84 The Court should
8* There is no more fundamental due process right than that to be tried before a
fair and impartial judge. Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216 (1971) (per cu-
riam); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). See generally Redish & Marshall, su-
pra note 51, at 475. In Tumey v. Ohio, the Supreme Court laid the foundation of what
has become a bulwark against twentieth century judicial bias. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523.
See also Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972).
,8, An analogy could be made to a team of surgeons arguing that, because it has
been discovered that the patient has a grapefruit-sized brain tumor, he has shown
"good cause" to be granted permission to return to his doctor to try to persuade her
that the original diagnosis of migraine was not the true cause of his headaches.
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have found a prima facie showing ofjudicial bias and dispensed
with the less important procedural question. Even assuming an
improbably narrow reading of Tumey--that only a judge with a
"direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest may be
deemed impermissibly biased' 8 -the Bracy Court should have
reversed.
1. Maloney's Direct, Pecuniary Interest In The Bracy Trial
Judge Maloney had a financial stake in Bracy. Thomas Ma-
loney's corruption began while he was a practicing attorney and
took on a new dimension when he assumed the bench in
1977. Before being snared in the Greylord investigation,
Judge Maloney regularly received considerable cash payments
from defendants facing him.lta Maloney's judicial office was,
first and foremost, a money-making operation.' 9 Convicting
those defendants who did not pay (such as William Bracy)
served Judge Maloney's financial interest in three ways. First, it
encouraged a defense attorney to "ante up" the next time he
appeared before Maloney.' 90 Second, it sent a message to inter-
185 Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523.
'" This position is unlikely, especially in light of the Court's subsequent decisions
in In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57
(1972), and Aetna Life Ins. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986). Nonetheless, it does have
some support. For example, the Court in Tumey expressly stated that "matters of kin-
ship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would seem generally to be
matters merely of legislative discretion." Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523. Moreover, in Ward,
Justices White and Rehnquist argued that Tumey should not be extended to control
when the judge-mayor has no direct financial stake in the outcome of the trial. Ward,
409 U.S. at 62 (White, J., dissenting). See also Redish & Marshall, supra note 51, at 500
(commenting that the Court unjustifiably has been "extremely reluctant to disqualify
ajudge when no direct financial interest is involved").
'87 Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 696 (1996) (Rovner, J., dissenting) ("It would
seem, in any event, that by the time Maloney ascended to the bench in 1977, he was
well groomed in the art ofjudicial corruption.").
"a8 United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 650-51 (7th Cir. 1995). For example, the
court found that, in one murder prosecution, Maloney agreed to accept a bribe of
$10,000. Id. at 655.
189 Bracy, 81 F.3d at 696 (Rovner, J., dissenting). Judge Rovner noted the "abun-
dant proof (and a federal jury's finding) that justice was for sale in Maloney's court-
room." Id. (Rovner,J., dissenting).
"0 Recall the testimony of defense attorney William Swano: after having bribed the
judge on several occasions, Swano neglected to do so on a slam-dunk case Swano de-
scribed as "a not guilty in any courtroom in the building." Id. at 697 (Rovner,J., dis-
senting). When Maloney convicted his client anyway, Swano concluded that "to
practice in front of Judge Maloney ... we had to pay." Id. (Rovner, J., dissenting).
Judge Rovner wrote, "One may infer from Swano's testimony that Maloney saw the
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ested members of the legal community (attorneys and clients)
that 'justice" was available-for a price. As Judge Rovner put it,
"fixed cases were a source of profit, whereas unfixed cases were
an opportunity... to 'advertise' in the defense bar."'9' If word
got out that Maloney's courtroom was at all legitimate and a de-
fendant could win a case on its merits, the judge's "credibility"
would suffer. Third, convicting as many non-paying defendants
as possible helped to keep Maloney in business.9 2 Judge Rovner
commented that this protected the "franchise by currying favor
with law and order minded voters and avoiding the ire of the
law enforcement community."
9 3
Continuing, for the moment, under the assumption that a
financial stake is required to show judicial bias, how much is
enough? The Tumey standard firmly established in American
jurisprudence that any interest suffices that might "offer a possi-
ble temptation to the average man as ajudge to forget the burden
of proof ... or which might lead him not to hold the balance
nice, clear, and true.' 94 A better question then, is "how much
and how direct a financial interest must there be to create the
'possible temptation?"'195 Two Supreme Court cases suggest that
the interest need not be so direct, nor so substantial after all.'9
Though similar to Tumey, Ward differed factually in one key
respect-there, the mayor-judge did not share directly in the
fines levied by his court.'9' Nonetheless, in Ward, the mayor's
responsibility for village finances apparently was deemed a di-
rect enough interest when a part thereof derived from court-
imposed fines.' 8 The Ward Court implied that the "direct, per-
Davis prosecution, in which no bribe was tendered, as an opportunity to teach Swano
a lesson that would ensure bribes in future cases." Id. (RovnerJ., dissenting).
... Id (RovnerJ., dissenting).
'92 Id. (RovnerJ., dissenting).
" Id (RovnerJ., dissenting).
94 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) (emphasis added); see also Redish &
Marshall, supra note 51, at 495.
'- Redish & Marshall, supra note 51, at 495. The authors conclude that "Bi]n light
of the severe practical barriers to conducting such analyses and the substantial dan-
gers to judicial independence that derive from such financial pressures, it seems rea-
sonable to conclude that any financial temptation, regardless of how indirect or
insubstantial, presents a possibility of temptation." Id at 495-96.
'96 See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 829 (1986); Ward v. Village of
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972).
197 Ward, 409 U.S. at 60. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing
Ward).
19' Ward, 409 U.S. at 60.
11091998]
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
sonal, substantial pecuniary" language in Tumey was more illus-
trative than exhaustive: "It]he fact that the mayor [in Tumey]
shared directly in the fees and costs did not define the limits of
the principle."'9
Likewise, in Aetna, Justice Brennan specifically explained
that he did "not understand that by this [direct, personal, sub-
stantial, pecuniary] language the Court states that only an inter-
est that satisfies this test will taint the judge's participation as a
due process violation.' ',20 In fact, the Aetna Court held Judge
Embry's interest to be "direct, personal, substantial, and pecu-
niary" even though the judge had no direct financial stake.20 1 A
closer look at the facts of that case, however, again indicates that
the Court used that language loosely. The Court founded its
conclusion that Judge Embry had a "direct" interest on the the-
ory that the Alabama Supreme Court's decision in Aetna sup-
posedly "raised the stakes ... [and enhanced] the legal status
and the settlement value of his own case. 2 °2  If the Court
deemed these clearly indirect financial interests sufficiently "di-
rect," then surely it should have concluded that Maloney's in-
terests were also sufficiently direct. Therefore, because Maloney
had a "direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest" at stake
in Bracy, the Supreme Court should have reversed the case out-
right.
"' 1&; see also Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532 (noting that "the pecuniary interest of the
Mayor in the result of his judgment is not the only reason for holding that due proc-
ess of law is denied to the defendant here").
m Aetna, 475 U.S. at 829 (Brennan, J., concurring). See supra note 75 and accom-
panying text; see also Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (pecuniary interest is
merely among the "various situations [that] have been identified in which experience
teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is
too high to be constitutionally tolerable"); Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dep't of Correc-
tions, 31 F.3d 1363, 1373 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (noting that "[o]f course, the Su-
preme Court has held the due process clause requires disqualification for interests
besides pecuniary interests").
2" Aetna, 475 U.S. at 824.
2 0 Id. at 823-24. In other words, the Alabama Supreme Court's Aetna decision, by
providing a favorable precedent for Justice Embry's own pending cases against Blue
Cross, supposedly increased Blue Cross's incentive to settle. I& The Court in Aetna,
after discussing the particular issues of that defendant's suit against the Aetna Life In-
surance Company, noted sharply that "[a] of these issues were present in Justice
Embry's lawsuit against Blue Cross." Id. at 823. Because of the similarities between
the Alabama Supreme Court's Aetna decision and Justice Embry's pending lawsuits,
the Court in Aetna held "that when Justice Embry made that judgment, he acted as a
judge in his own case." Id. at 824. See also supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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2. A More Plausible Reading ofTumey and its Progeny
Urges The Same Result
Even though Bracy satisfied the narrower Tumey test, he
should not be burdened with its arbitrary distinction between
financial and non-financial interests. The decision in Tumey of-
fered no guidance in explaining why the former rises to a con-
stitutional level but the latter does not.2 3 Even discounting the
financial interests involved, Judge Maloney had an equally ur-
gent non-pecuniary motive-i.e., the desire to deflect suspicion
from two contemporaneous, fixed cases. As Justice Brennan
commented in Aetna: "tA]n interest is sufficiently direct if the
outcome of the challenged proceeding substantially advances
the judge's opportunity to attain some desired goal even if that
goal is not actually attained in that proceeding."
201
The Court's post-Tumey judicial bias cases suggest a broader
standard than the "financial interest only" interpretation. 5
Under this more plausible reading of the Tumey principle, the
case for reversing Bracy's conviction is unassailable., The lan-
guage of the judicial bias cases themselves, coupled with the ex-
traordinary nature of Maloney's bias, demanded bold action by
the Court. Moreover, public policy reinforces this conclusion.
The strongest support of an outright reversal of Bracy's
conviction lies in the principle established in Tumey: that having
any interest that "offer[s] a possible temptation to the average man
as ajudge to forget the burden of proof.., or which might lead
him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true" disqualifies a
judge from presiding over a case.2° This concept has been con-
As Redish and Marshall write:
This distinction in constitutional treatment between personal bias and financial
interest cannot be justified by a difference in the degree of temptation involved.
Ajudge is likely to be far more concerned with giving his brother-in-law a break
than with securing $5.00 for a traffic conviction. Similarly, the temptation to get
revenge against a party that the judge dislikes may be as alluring as pecuniary
gain.
Redish & Marshall, supra note 51, at 501.
Aetna, 475 U.S. at 830 (Brennan,J., concurring).
20' That is, the Court's interpretation in In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), Ward
v. City of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), Vasquez v. Hillay, 474 U.S. 254 (1986), and
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986) inform and extend the original stan-
dard set forth in Tumey.
2 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) (emphases added). Again, although
some argue that the Court in Tumey indicated that the interest must have a financial
element, this Note argues that this is an implausibly narrow reading of Tumey, particu-
larly in light of the more expansive language found in laterjudicial bias decisions.
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firmed repeatedly in subsequent cases. It is clear that this coun-
try's judicial system will not tolerate even the possibility ofjudicial
unfairness.
207
Actual bias or influence need not be shown.208 The rule is
necessarily and deliberately stringent.2 9 Thus, Bracy should not
be required to provide evidence that Maloney employed a cam-
ouflaging bias in favor of the prosecution in non-bribe cases. As
the Seventh Circuit acknowledged in Bracy's case, "[W]hen the
trial judge is tainted by a pervasive conflict of interest-in other
words, one not limited to a particular litigant or type of case-
evidence that the taint had a discernible effect on a given case is
unnecessary., 210  Clearly, due process is not served when a de-
fendant such as William Bracy is convicted by a corrupt judge
who, though sworn to uphold the law, is actually absorbed in his
211own illicit enterprise.
The Court, while recognizing that this rigorous screening
may result in disqualifying judges who are capable of holding
the balance "nice, clear, and true,21  nonetheless insisted that
'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."2 3 Close adher-
207 Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136.
20 For example, the Court in Tunzey reversed despite no indication whatsoever that
this potential bias actually influenced the lower court's decisions, concluding that the
prospect of a loss of twelve dollars in court costs was temptation enough. Tumey, 273
U.S. at 532. The Court in Aetna, though holding that the judge had a far more direct
interest in the outcome of that case than was necessary for a bias claim, insisted that
they need not decide whether a judge was influenced, but only whether presiding
over the case might offer a "possible temptation." Aetna, 475 U.S. at 824-25. Simi-
larly, the Court in Ward specifically rejected the argument that an Ohio statute was
sufficient without federal interference to protect against judicial bias, arguing that
"[i]f this means that an accused must show special prejudice in his particular case, the
statute requires too much and protects too little." Ward, 409 U.S. at 61.
' Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136; see also United States v. Guglielmini, 384 F.2d 602,
605 (2d Cir. 1967) ("Few claims are more difficult to resolve than the claim that the
trial judge, presiding over a jury trial, has thrown his weight in favor of one side to
such an extent that it cannot be said that the trial has been a fair one.").
2 0 Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 698 (7th Cir. 1996).
21 See Ward, 409 U.S. at 60. The Court in Ward commented: "This... is a situation
in which an official perforce occupies two practically and seriously inconsistent posi-
tions, one partisan and the other judicial, and necessarily involves a lack of due proc-
ess of law in the trial of defendants charged with crimes before him." Id.
212 Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532.
213 Aetna, 475 U.S. at 825; see also Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486
U.S. 847, 865 n.12 (1988); Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 196 (1982); Marshall
v.Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 243 (1980); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465
(1971); Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136; Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
Cf. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 161 n.3 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Wise ob-
1112
1998] WHATPRICEJUSTICE? 1113
ence to this principle serves two public policy purposes. First,
because not all improprieties are discernible," 4 such a rule low-
ers what could otherwise be prohibitively high evidentiary hur-
dles facing a petitioner. 5 The Court clearly has chosen to err
on the side of caution by disqualifying a judge if she has some
discernible possible bias. Second, endeavoring to avoid even the
appearance of impropriety serves to reinforce the faith of the
American people in the criminal justice system.1 In other
words, it accomplishes the critical goal of "generat[ing] the feel-
ing, so important to a popular government, thatjustice has been
done."21
Lastly, the very pervasiveness of Judge Maloney's corruption
required that Bracy's conviction be overturned. It is true that
the Supreme Court recognizes that not every "possible tempta-
tion" mandates judicial disqualification .2 1  To weed out frivolous
bias claims, the Court has enhanced the burden of persuasion,
requiring the moving party to "overcome a presumption of
honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators." 9 This
presumption inoculates a judge from disqualification for a mi-
nor but "possible" biasing influence. As the Bracy Court com-
mented, "Ordinarily, we presume that public officials have
properly discharged their official duties . . . [b]ut, unfortu-
nately, the presumption has been soundly rebutted: Maloney
was shown to be thoroughly steeped in corruption through his
servers have long understood that the appearance ofjustice is as important as its real-
ity.").
" Redish & Marshall, supra note 51, at 483. See also Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684,
698-99 (7th Cir. 1996) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority "for being na-
ive about what the cold page of a trial record will reveal").
"' See; e.g., supra note 140.
216 See Amicus Brief of Concerned Illinois Lawyers and Law Professors at 17, Bracy
(No. 96-6133).
27Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951); see also
Redish & Marshall, supra note 51, at 483-84. Messrs. Redish and Marshall note:
Few situations more severely threaten trust in the judicial process than the per-
ception that a litigant never had a chance because the decisionmaker may have
owed the other side special favors.... The Supreme Court has forcefully recog-
nized this truth.... Indeed, if there exists any reasonable doubt about the adju-
dicator's impartiality ... provision of the most elaborate procedural safeguards
will not avail to create this appearance ofjustice.
Id.
219 See Aetna, 475 U.S. at 826 (remarking that, at some point, a "biasing influence..
will be too remote and insubstantial to violate the constitutional constraints").
2'9 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
public trial and conviction."220 Therefore, with Judge Maloney
stripped of this protective presumption, the impact of his "pos-
sible temptation" should have been presumptively greater.
Moreover, it should not be overlooked that the Court evalu-
ates judicial bias claims against the measuring stick of the "aver-
age" judge.2  Maloney was far from average. 2  As his string of
convictions proved, Judge Maloney acquitted murderers for a
small payment of blood money. 3 As Judge Rovner remarked,
"The victims of those crimes, their families, the people of Illi-
nois, the concept of justice, [224] were apparently worth no more
to him. "2  Faced with a judge as corrupt as Maloney, the Bracy
Court erred in applying a standard designed for the "average
man." After all, as the Court asserted in Vasquez, "[w]hen the
trial judge is discovered to have had some basis for rendering a
biased judgment, his actual motivations are hidden from review,
and we must presume that the process was impaired.", 6 William
Bracy deserved nothing less.
B. THE COURT'S RELUCTANCE TO REVERSE CONVICTION
There are several reasons why any court might resist over-
turning the conviction of a defendant like Bracy. The evidence
against Bracy appears overwhelming.227 However, the right to
due process is not a function of the nature of the evidence of-
fered against the accused. 8 The inculpatory evidence in Tumey
' Bracy v. Gramley, 117 S. CL 1793, 1799 (1997).
2' See Aetna, 475 U.S. at 825; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
See Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 700 (7th Cir. 1996) (Rovner, J., dissenting).
Judge Rovner argues:
Maloney's bribetaking... [was not] just another "bias" or "influence," something
external to his personality, or at least some severable part of it, that at most
"might" have given him the "incentive" to behave in a particular fashion on occa-
sions when he was not bribed .... Maloney's bribetaking removes him from the
category of the "average" man... [and implicates] a far darker set of impulses
than we confront in the usual bias case.
Id, (Rovner,J., dissenting).
Id (Rovner,J., dissenting).
'24 As Judge Rovner acidly noted, "The question we should be asking ourselves is
not what impact the lack of a bribe had on Maloney's decisionmaking in a particular
case, but what his willingness to accept a bribe tells us about his view ofjudging." Id.
(Rovner,J., dissenting).
I (Rovner,J., dissenting).
16 Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986).
Bracy, 81 F.3d at 702-03 (Rovner,J., dissenting).
Id. at 703 (Rovner,J., dissenting).
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was equally decisive. 22 Nonetheless, the Court in Tumey asserted
that "[n] o matter what the evidence was against him, he had the
right to have an impartial judge." 230
The availability of appellate review proves an equally
.meritless reason to resist overturning a conviction before a bi-
ased judge. For example, the respondent in Ward argued that
any such unfairness would be remedied by the procedural safe-
guard of appellate review.23' However, the Court in Ward spe-
cifically rejected this argument.s The Court in Bracy, while not
specifically making this argument, implied as much when it
commented 'that the Illinois Supreme Court twice affirmed
Bracy's sentence and conviction.s The Ward Court asserted
that "the State's trial court procedure... [is not rendered] con-
stitutionally acceptable simply because the State eventually of-
fers a defendant an impartial adjudication. Petitioner is entitled
to a neutral and detached judge in the first instance."2 Simi-
larly, the Court in Ward doubted that the prospect of being re-
versed on appeal had any impact on a judge's incentive to
convict.us Judge Maloney was no exception.2
It also has been suggested that in bench trials a judgment
need not be vacated if the disqualified judge cast other than the
"'Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927).
2W id.
"' Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61 (1972).
212 Id. Note that this argument would also violate the principle that constitutional
structural defects in a case, such as judicial bias, require automatic reversal. See Sulli-
van v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 283 (1993).
Bracyv. Gramley, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 1798 n.6 (1997). The Court said, "We express
no opinion on the correctness of the various discretionary rulings cited by petitioner
as examples of Maloney's bias. We note, however, that many of these rulings have
been twice upheld, and that petitioner's convictions and sentence have been twice af-
firmed, by the Illinois Supreme Court." Id. (citation omitted).
2' Ward, 409 U.S. at 61-62. Furthermore, Judge Rovner took issue with this line of
thinking:
It is no answer to the charge of corruption that Maloney's discretionary rulings
on their face appear to fall within the realm of reason ... [W]e assume that the
reasonable judge does not act for malignant ends... [However, if] ajudge exer-
cises her discretion for invidious reasons, she has exceeded her authority.
Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 1996) (RovnerJ., dissenting).
Ward, 409 U.S. at 61-62.
As already explained, Maloney's incentive to convict was considerable. Moreo-
ver, even if the possibility of reversal was of concern to him, Judge Maloney knew how
to arrive at an appeal-proof result. As Judge Rovner remarked, "A judge who wishes
to be tough on the defendant need not adopt the manner of the Tasmanian Devil to
do it." Bracy, 81 F.3d at 698-99 (RovnerJ., dissenting). See also supra note 140.
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deciding vote. 23' However, whether a constitutional violation
has occurred should not depend on conjecture about who cast
the decisive vote. This may lead to incorrect assumptions and
should be irrelevant to the analysis.2 38 Bracy was convicted by a
jury, but in a jury trial a judge still exercises great influence, "if
not directly upon the jury, then upon the myriad events that
culminate in the jury's decision."2 9
The Court in Bracy declined to adjudicate the due process
issue and declined to follow the clear mandate of the Constitu-
tion and its own precedent, choosing instead to resolve only the
narrow habeas question.240 Given the role that cost/benefit bal-
ancing played in the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Bracy, it seems
likely that the costly ramifications241 of a reversal of Bracy's con-
viction influenced the Supreme Court's decision to avoid the is-
sue altogether.242 Even admitting the possibility of Maloney's
bias in Bracy's trial and acknowledging the plausibility of the
idea that "a judge's corruption is likely to permeate his judicial
conduct rather than be encapsulated in the particular cases in
which he takes bribes, 243 the Seventh Circuit declined to grant a
new trial or additional discovery.244 The Court concluded that
the consequences of such an outcome were "unacceptable."245
'7 SeeAetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 827 (1986).
Id. at 831 (Blackmun,J., concurring). In Aetna, regardless of thatjudge's role in
the final decision, his mere presence posed an intolerable risk of subtly distorting the
judicial process. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). Thus, the "violation of the Due Pro-
cess Clause occurred when Justice Embry sat on this case." I. at 833 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
2'9 Bracy, 81 F.3d at 701 (Rovner,J., dissenting). Elaborating,Judge Rovner said:
I mean the extraordinary ability of the trial judge to shape the trial itself. It is
she who decides what evidence the jury may hear, how counsel may behave in
front of the jury, what arguments may be made, how they may be made, what le-
gal principles the jury must apply, and even, to a significant degree, who will sit
on the jury.
I. (RovnerJ., dissenting).
2"0 Bracy v. Gramley, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 1796 n.4 (1997).
24' During his judicial tenure, Judge Maloney sat on over 6000 cases. Bracy, 81 F.3d
at 689.
212 There is some evidence that this sentiment exists on the current Court. See, e.g.,
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 277 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he
Court's remedy must stand or fall on its utility as a deterrent to government officials
who seek to exclude particular groups from grand juries, weighed against the cost
that the remedy imposes on society.").
243 Bracy, 81 F.3d at 689.
211 Id. at 690-91.
24 Id. at 689.
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In his depressingly empirical fashion, Judge Posner asserted that
any "automatic rule must be interpreted circumspectly, with due
recognition of the cost to society of overturning the convictions
of the guilty in order to vindicate an abstract interest in proce-
dural fairness. 246 Judge Posner seems to have forgotten that the
most fundamental principle of constitutional adjudication is
that we have a government of laws, not men,247 and that what he
calls "abstract interest[s] in procedural fairness" are also known
as the Bill of Rights.
In her scathing dissent to the Seventh Circuit decision,
Judge Rovner reminded the majority that this was not an em-
pirical matter, implying that its cost/benefit analysis was mis-
placed. Judge Rovner then asked: "What are we to say to
Bracy and Collins, that they had the right to an honest, impar-
tial judge but that the breadth of past corruption in the Illinois
judiciary makes it too costly to enforce that right?"249 Justice
Rovner is correct. This is a matter of principle, not empiricism.
The judicial process is necessarily "principle-prone and princi-
ple-bound," and courts are "a most unsuitable instrument for
the formation of policy" based on empirical pragmatism. °
VI. THE POST-BRACYFUTUR
By itself, the decision in Bracy appears to amount to little
more than a vacuous truism-i.e., because William Bracy had a
biased and corrupt judge in his trial, he should be permitted
discovery in order to show that he had a biased and corrupt
judge in his trial. The Court's exceedingly narrow holding on
an arcane procedural point resulted in a missed opportunity to
send a stronger message on the more substantive constitutional
issues. On the other hand, MacArthurJustice Center's Locke E.
Bowman opined that Bracy will still be significant because it
"takes very seriously the point that a criminal defendant is enti-
tled to an unbiased judge and it doesn't require a showing of an
246 Id.
217 STEPHEN B. PRESSER, RECAPTURING THE CONsTITUTION 33 (1994). Professor
Presser criticizes the Court for "approach [ing] the matters brought before it on an ad
hoc basis, weighing the competing interests of the parties in a manner which tradi-
tionally was supposed to be done by legislatures." Id at 50.
21 Bracy, 81 F.3d at 701 (RovnerJ., dissenting).
249 Id. at 703 (RovnerJ., dissenting).
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 175 (1970).
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actually biased ruling in the particular case in order to require
further investigation. That would have been a very difficult
hurdle for Bracy to have met." 25' Any hope of leadership or
salutary impact from this decision rests solely with the lower
court judges. Judge Maloney sat on over 600002 cases.213  As
some of those who were convicted in his court now resurface
with claims of judicial bias, and as courts begin to grapple with
the fiendishly difficult evidentiary issues, the most frequently
asked question will be, "What should we do when we simply do
not know whether a defendant received a fair trial?"
We do not know now, nor are we likely ever to know what
Judge Maloney's true disposition towards Bracy was.2 Of
course, we need not know anything; a mere likelihood or possi-
bility of bias is sufficient for a claim to prevail, particularly given
the unique circumstances of Maloney's corruption.255 However,
it is instructive that one of the first post-Bracy hearings resulted
in a vacated conviction and a new trial. 6 Relying heavily upon
212 Marcia Coyle, New Trialfor Six on Death Row?, NAT'LL.J.,June 23, 1997, atA10.
252 This number is not as daunting as it sounds. Many of these resulted in acquit-
tals or guilty pleas, and many of the convicted have already served their time. Id. Mr.
Bowman indicated that he "can't quantify the number [of cases] in which there
might be some challenge [as a result of Bracy], but it's certainly much, much smaller
than 6,000.... Each individual would have to meet this threshold of circumstantial
evidence." Id. Even had the Court reversed Bracy's conviction and retried him (as
this Note argues it should have done), the Cook County judicial system would not
have been plunged into the confusion and anarchy the Seventh Circuit predicted.
Professor Marshall urges an alternative:
Leaving matters.., to the courts to straighten out is no solution. Besides the of-
ten insurmountable procedural barriers that face inmates raising new claims
years after their convictions have become final, most inmates whose convictions
have become final have no attorneys and no resources .... An independent
commission... should be created to study each of the cases involving Maloney.
Lawrence C. Marshall, Righting the Wrongs In Our Criminal Justice System, CI. TRiB.,
June 16, 1997, atA7.
2'3 Bracy, 81 F.3d at 689.
"4 Id. at 699 (Rovner,J., dissenting).
25 See supra text accompanying notes 180-226; see also Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S.
254, 263 (1986) (noting that "when the trial judge is discovered to have had some ba-
sis for rendering a biased judgment, his actual motivations are hidden from review,
and we must presume that the process was impaired").
People v. Titone, No. 83-C-127 (Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill. July, 1997).
This was the post-conviction hearing of Dino Titone, convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to death in 1984 by Judge Maloney. Titone alleged thatJudge Maloney solic-
ited a bribe from his family in return for an acquittal, but returned the bribe and
convicted him when he correctly perceived that he was a possible target of Operation
Greylord. Though the request was only for discovery and an evidentiary hearing,
Judge Strayhorn vacated the conviction entirely.
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Judge Rovner's dissent in Bracy, Cook County Circuit Court
Judge Earl Strayhorn said,
I can't answer the question of was he tried in a fair tribunal before a
judge who gave him a fair and honest trial.... Honestly I don't know...
[However,] no amount of procrastination on my part, no amount of
reluctance on my part can wipe out the fact that under the circum-
stances that have been presented here what went on in that courtroom as
to Dino Titone was notjustice. And that Dino Titone did not receive the
kind of a fair, impartial trial before a fair, unbiased, impartial judge that
his constitutional right as a citizen required. 7
The Seventh Circuit in Bracy concluded that "the probability
is slight that a program of depositions aimed at crooks... will
yield" the evidence being sought by Bracy.28 Such complacency
must not be replicated in the lower courts. 'Ve cannot, there-
fore, hide behind the jury's verdict. . . [w]e cannot turn our
backs on the Constitution."29
VII. CONCLUSION
In Bracy v. Gramley, the Court ruled that a habeas corpus pe-
titioner had shown "good cause" for discovery on his due proc-
ess claim of judicial bias.260 The defendant had been convicted
before a judge who was subsequently found to have been en-
gaged in a pattern of bribery, extortion, and racketeering at the
time of the defendant's trial. The Court relied on the facts of
the judge's conviction as well as "additional evidence" and "spe-
cific allegations" in order to adjudicate the discovery issue.
The Court in Bracy should have reversed the petitioner's
conviction outright. First, the Court should have embraced a
broad reading of the Tumey standard, amply supported by post-
Tumey judicial bias decisions. Even under the most narrow in-
terpretation of Tumey, this particular judge would be disquali-
fied. Instead, the Court immersed itself in the procedural
minutia of the habeas corpus and discovery questions, refusing
to address the clear due process violation that occurred when
the judge first sat for the case. The threshold showing for judi-
cial bias is intentionally low, the rule necessarily stringent.
Once a probability of bias has been found, the entire trial is pre-
sumed infected. Moreover, judicial bias is the type of structural
257 id.
's Bracy, 81 F.3d at 691.
2" Id. at 702-03 (RovnerJ., dissenting).
"0 Bracy v. Gramley, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 1795 (1997).
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constitutional defect that defies harmless-error review and de-
mands automatic reversal. The Bracy decision may be seen as a
pragmatic compromise between denying any form of relief and
"opening the floodgates" with the more dramatic remedy called
for here. Under these conditions, however, given the extraor-
dinary depth and breadth of this judge's corruption, anything
short of outright reversal smacks of unfortunate judicial com-
placency.
TIMoTHY R. TERRY
